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A THEMATIC APPROACH TO TEACHING CRIMINAL 
ADJUDICATION 
ADRIAAN LANNI* AND CAROL STEIKER** 
A few years ago, I (Adriaan Lanni) decided to teach Criminal Adjudication 
for the first time and approached my colleague Carol Steiker, who had taught 
the course several times, for advice. It turned out that Carol had never been 
entirely satisfied with the conventional criminal adjudication course, which 
emphasizes federal constitutional doctrine and a chronological organization 
(from “bail to jail”). We decided to collaborate on putting together a new 
course, one that takes a more selective, thematic approach that uses a broader 
range of materials to examine the operation of the criminal justice system. In 
Part I, Carol Steiker describes and critiques the conventional approach to 
teaching Criminal Adjudication. In Part II, we discuss our thematic and 
problem-centered approach to the course. In Part III, Adriaan Lanni discusses 
her experience teaching the new course. We include a sample syllabus as an 
appendix. 
I.  THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Although there is surely variation in the teaching of Criminal Adjudication, 
there appears to be a conventional approach that is marked by two 
commitments: (1) a dominant focus on federal constitutional law and (2) a 
chronological organization (from “bail to jail”). These conventions are visible 
in the organization of most of the casebooks, treatises, and study aids on the 
topic. Moreover, discussions with colleagues at other institutions suggest that 
these conventions are widely followed in the classroom. I (Carol Steiker) have 
used the conventional approach in teaching Criminal Adjudication every time I 
have taught it since I joined the academy in 1992, including while teaching the 
course jointly with my late colleague Bill Stuntz, whose own casebook largely 
follows the conventional approach.1 
The conventional approach is a product of both history and logic. The 
constitutional focus of the conventional approach is a product of the “big 
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 1. See RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, DEBRA A. 
LIVINGSTON & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2011). 
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bang” birth of criminal procedure courses in the 1960s and 1970s. The Warren 
Court’s revolution in criminal procedure, when the Court incorporated 
virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, created a large quantity 
of new constitutional law regulating state criminal processes. This new body of 
controversial, ever-changing constitutional doctrine soon grew too large and 
complex to fit into traditional courses on constitutional law. Hence, new 
courses were born to address this burgeoning area of constitutional regulation. 
As intuited by the directors of the hit television series Law & Order, it makes 
sense to divide the world of criminal justice into the separate jurisdictions of 
police investigations and criminal prosecutions. Consequently, most schools 
eventually adopted two separate courses, one on the constitutional constraints 
on police practices and the other on the constitutional doctrines that structure 
the adjudicative process. The adjudication course deals with a hodgepodge of 
issues that do not have the same degree of thematic unity as police practices 
do. Moreover, many teachers of the adjudication course come to the academy 
after having worked as prosecutors or defense lawyers in the litigation 
trenches. Hence, logic seems to compel a chronological approach to the 
adjudicative process, organizing the constitutional issues in the order in which 
they are confronted over the course of litigating a criminal case. 
There is much to be said for a chronological, largely constitutional course 
on the adjudicative process. A constitutional focus can be defended because 
the federal Constitution governs all across the country and marks the floor 
above which state legislation (and state constitutional law) must operate. And 
chronological organization simply makes intuitive sense; it feels familiar to 
litigators and is easy for students to follow. In my years of teaching Criminal 
Adjudication along these lines, I felt that I was offering students a valuable 
educational experience. And yet, I also always felt vaguely dissatisfied with 
the course. When a younger colleague (Adriaan Lanni) approached me to talk 
about teaching the course for the first time, I finally systematically reflected on 
my experience with the course, and came to see and articulate some of the 
pitfalls of the conventional approach. 
First, a constitutional focus inevitably leads to too much emphasis on 
constitutional doctrine to the detriment of systemic understanding. I found 
myself spending too much time, for example, teaching about the scope of the 
constitutional right to counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright2 and its progeny) and the 
doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel (Strickland v. Washington3 and its 
progeny) instead of the structural impediments to providing adequate indigent 
defense services. Although the Supreme Court cases contain soaring language 
about the importance of the right to counsel as the vehicle through which all 
 
 2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 3. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
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other rights are asserted,4 constitutional law does not provide enough of a 
window to understand the problems plaguing indigent defense in the United 
States. Inadequate funding, docket pressures, lack of independence from the 
judiciary, and other structural issues are at the root of the perennial crisis in 
indigent defense. Understanding the variety of state and local funding 
mechanisms, as well as the variety of structures for the appointment, 
supervision, and training of defense counsel, is at least as crucial to 
understanding “the right to counsel” as, say, Strickland’s two-part test. 
However, a constitutional focus can create pressure to overemphasize doctrine 
and underemphasize context; one can feel the students’ restlessness at the shift 
from black letter law to descriptive social science, which feels “soft” and 
unlikely to be tested on a traditional law school final exam. 
Second, the traditional approach—the combination of a constitutional 
focus and a chronological organization—produces a course that 
overemphasizes the trial as the central feature of the American criminal justice 
system. There is a lot of constitutional law about trials—about jury selection, 
speedy trials, confrontation, cross-examination, and the like—that creates a 
misleading sense of the significance of the jury trial as a mechanism of case 
disposition. Once one commits to a chronological survey of constitutional law, 
one feels pressure to provide “coverage” of the issues commensurate to their 
constitutional significance, which is generally measured by the play that the 
issues get in the Supreme Court. However, constitutional significance is not a 
good proxy for systemic significance. For example, the Supreme Court has 
given a great deal of attention to race discrimination in jury selection (in 
Batson v. Kentucky5 and its progeny) and to the constitutional right to confront 
witnesses at trial (in Crawford v. Washington6 and its progeny). However, in 
an era in which fewer than five percent of cases are resolved by trial, it simply 
does not make sense to emphasize trial rights at the expense of understanding 
the system of plea bargaining, which is the dominant mode of adjudication. 
Yet I would wager that trial rights take up a much greater share of most 
criminal adjudication courses than does plea bargaining—and the 
responsibility for this state of affairs lies largely with the conventional 
approach to the course. 
Third, the pressure for “coverage” of the most important constitutional 
issues from “bail to jail” not only over-emphasizes the trial but also creates 
pressure to include doctrinally complex issues that simply are not that 
important relative to other things that might be studied. For example, most 
criminal adjudication casebooks include significant coverage of the law of 
 
 4. E.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (concluding the right to counsel is so “fundamental” 
that it is “essential to fair trials”). 
 5. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84–87 (1986). 
 6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 
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double jeopardy, which has been reconsidered by the Supreme Court multiple 
times, and, as a consequence, is highly complex and doctrinally difficult. The 
Court’s interest notwithstanding, double jeopardy is an issue whose systemic 
importance does not match the time necessary to master it. In contrast, the 
problem of innocence in the criminal justice system—the conditions that 
produce wrongful convictions and possible remedies for them—does not have 
an obvious constitutional doctrinal “hook” and thus can end up getting short 
shrift in a conventional criminal adjudication course. Here, too, I would wager 
that most criminal adjudication courses spend more time on double jeopardy 
than on the causes of wrongful convictions. 
Finally, a chronological constitutional survey from “bail to jail” lacks 
thematic coherence. It is hard to come up with themes that link such disparate 
topics as preventive detention, jury selection, double jeopardy, and standards 
for appellate review. Of course, not everyone who teaches Criminal 
Adjudication includes exactly the same mix of topics. For example, I included 
in my syllabus the topics of fair trial/free press and defendant competency, 
which Bill Stuntz did not. And Bill Stuntz included in his syllabus the topics of 
confrontation and habeas corpus, which I did not. However, both of our 
conventional syllabi presented similar problems with regard to thematic 
coherence. The pressure that the conventional approach exerts toward 
comprehensive coverage of constitutional issues at every stage of the criminal 
process inevitably will produce syllabi that contain a jumble of issues that do 
not speak to one another—nor to the most pressing problems of the criminal 
justice system. 
II.  A LESS CONVENTIONAL APPROACH 
Mindful of some of the pitfalls of the conventional approach, we (Adriaan 
Lanni and Carol Steiker) collaborated to create a new criminal adjudication 
syllabus that would resist the conventional approach’s commitment to 
comprehensive, chronological coverage of constitutional law. This new 
approach offers a set of curated themes instead of a comprehensive or strictly 
chronological approach, and promotes engagement with wide-ranging 
readings, real-life case studies, and visiting speakers that augment a much 
scaled-back consideration of constitutional doctrine. 
A. Themes 
Instead of starting with the initial appearance and ending with appellate 
and post-conviction review (i.e. instead of the comprehensive chronological 
approach), we decided to be selective about the themes covered, scaling back 
to eight themes from the eighteen or so topics that I (Carol Steiker) covered in 
my conventional course. Some of the themes we chose—such as “counsel,” 
“charging,” and “the jury”—are familiar topics that no doubt would appear on 
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any conventional syllabus as well. Moreover, we chose to order some of our 
themes in a chronological fashion, with “charging” preceding “plea 
bargaining,” and “plea bargaining” preceding “sentencing,” for example. 
Despite these apparent similarities to the conventional approach, our 
thematic approach diverges more substantially from a conventional syllabus 
than a superficial glance at our themes might suggest. First, our thematic 
approach allowed us to leave out many topics that are often included in a 
chronological survey of constitutional issues. For example, we did not include 
consideration of the initial appearance, the right to a speedy trial, 
confrontation, cross-examination, compulsory process, prosecutorial argument, 
double jeopardy, appellate review, or habeas corpus. Our thematic syllabus 
simply makes no pretense at comprehensive coverage of constitutional issues 
in the criminal process, which frees up time to go deeper and to go well 
beyond constitutional doctrine on the selected themes. 
Second, the syllabus diverges significantly from a chronological 
organization. The first theme on the syllabus—“counsel”—gets extended 
treatment that includes materials not only on the right to representation at trial 
and during plea bargaining but also on appeal, as well as materials on post-trial 
review for effectiveness of counsel, and an in-depth look at structural reform 
litigation and other avenues to address systemic problems in the funding and 
delivery of indigent defense services. This systemic focus pervades our 
thematic approach with the conscious intent that the students see each theme 
not as a successive “stage” of the criminal process, but rather as a facet of a 
complex and interwoven “system” of criminal justice. The biggest divergence 
from a chronological approach comes in the last theme in the syllabus, 
“Outcomes: Racial Effects and the Problem of Innocence.” The problems of 
discrimination and wrongful conviction pervade the entire criminal process and 
are the cumulative product of choices made all along the way from “bail to 
jail.” By explicitly naming “outcomes” as a theme, we deliberately step away 
from a focus on procedure to consider systemic effects. 
In short, our thematic approach not only streamlines and deepens 
consideration of the chosen topics, it does so in a way that signals that the 
course is not one on “constitutional criminal procedure,” as the conventional 
approach would have it; rather, it is a course about adjudication within our 
criminal justice system. 
B. A Problem-Centered Approach 
The second innovation was to include coverage of important topics that are 
not fully addressed by Supreme Court doctrine. In many instances, we used a 
problem-centered approach, offering doctrinal and non-doctrinal readings, and 
discussion questions to address a particular issue—for example, the funding of 
indigent defense counsel, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, racial 
impacts, and innocence—rather than using the case law to organize these 
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topics. In some instances, this involved relatively minor reframing and 
supplementation of the traditional doctrinal readings. In others, we made room 
in the syllabus for topics that are traditionally not covered or covered only 
briefly. And in some cases, we created substantially new material. For 
example, we engaged a writer from the Harvard Law School Case Studies 
Program to help us develop a case study of the charging and plea bargaining 
process in the Aaron Swartz prosecution.7 We also brought in a number of 
visiting speakers to address emerging issues. 
One relatively minor change was to begin each topic with policy-based 
readings rather than begin with a case and fold in policy questions as part of 
the discussion/critique of the case. For example, rather than jumping right into 
the case law on the right to counsel, we introduced this topic by comparing the 
current methods of providing counsel for indigent defendants with potential 
alternatives, like voucher systems. While these topics are typically discussed in 
criminal adjudication classes, getting the students in the mindset of thinking 
about the status quo and its alternatives placed these policy questions on an 
equal footing with the standard doctrinal topics that we also covered. In some 
cases, the problem-oriented framing suggested new questions for discussion. 
For example, we briefly considered alternatives to our charging system, 
including historical examples of private prosecution systems. We also assigned 
a reality TV show of a French homicide prosecution to give an example of a 
more inquisitorial-style civil law system. 
The problem-centered approach also led us to include material for some of 
our themes that are absent or mentioned only briefly in the notes in most 
casebooks. We devoted a day to systemic challenges to underfunding of 
indigent defense counsel. In addition to discussing representative cases, we 
invited speakers involved in current systemic litigation: the first year, Steve 
Hanlon talked about his lawsuit challenging Missouri’s system of funding 
counsel for the indigent; the next year, Steve Bright discussed a similar case in 
Georgia. As part of our sentencing topic, we devoted part of a day to the 
problem of “debtor’s prisons,” discussing Bearden v. Georgia8 (which is 
mentioned only in a note in the casebook we used) and the Department of 
Justice’s report on the Ferguson Police Department.9 We also discussed 
 
 7. For a description of the problems this case presented, see ADRIAAN LANNI, CAROL 
STEIKER & ELIZABETH MORONEY, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CHARGING AND PLEA 
BARGAINING: THE AARON SWARTZ CASE (A) (June 2014), http://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/ 
prosecutorial-discretion-in-charging-and-plea-bargaining-the-aaron-swartz-case-a/ [http://perma. 
cc/JG9J-9RVC] (click on “Add to Cart” and follow steps for free download of the PDF 
publication). 
 8. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664, 667–68 (1983). 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 42–43, 100 (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-re 
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problem-solving approaches to sentencing through readings and speakers. One 
year, a judge spoke about drug and mental health courts; in another, we had a 
speaker from a local restorative justice community-police partnership. 
A major impetus behind the course innovation was our sense that 
constitutional doctrine did not adequately address the process of charging and 
plea bargaining. In a world of guilty pleas, the prosecutor’s determinations of 
what to charge and what bargain to offer are the ball game, yet the case law 
regulates this process only minimally. Whether they become prosecutors or 
defense lawyers, students who hope to work in the criminal justice system 
must understand the process of charging and plea bargaining. While some 
casebooks provide short charging problems, we wanted an in-depth case study 
that would allow the students to role-play the entire charging and bargaining 
process in a case. We chose the Aaron Swartz prosecution because information 
about successive plea offers, as well as details about the alleged crime and the 
defendant, were readily available. Of course, Aaron Swartz is far from a 
typical defendant. But the public controversy over his prosecution and the 
criminal penalties authorized under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act10 
invited a lively discussion about the extent to which the case was or was not 
representative of more ordinary prosecutions. The case study teaching plan 
(available with the case study from the Harvard Law School Case Studies 
Program11) calls for students to play the role of either the prosecutor or defense 
attorney at a series of decision points, such as each charging decision and plea 
offer. At each decision point, students are asked to articulate the considerations 
that may have led the prosecutor or defense counsel to a particular position, 
and whether they would have taken a different approach. 
Two of our themes—race and innocence—are not typically taught as 
stand-alone topics.12 The readings we put together on racial impacts included 
both cases (United States v. Armstrong13 and McCleskey v. Kemp14) and 
secondary readings, including material on statistical disparities in the criminal 
justice system, implicit bias research, and portions of Michelle Alexander’s 
The New Jim Crow.15 The class on innocence focused less on doctrine than on 
the sources of error in false convictions and related reform proposals. Teaching 
race and innocence as independent topics, instead of talking about them briefly 
 
leases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7RG-
C9SH] [hereinafter DOJ INVESTIGATION]. 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2013). 
 11. LANNI, STEIKER & MORONEY, supra note 7. 
 12. See Cynthia Lee, Making Black and Brown Lives Matter: Incorporating Race Into the 
Criminal Procedure Curriculum, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 481 (2016). 
 13. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996). 
 14. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987). 
 15. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2012). 
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and intermittently in the course of the standard tour of the case law, allows 
students to analyze these problems more openly and comprehensively. This 
approach encourages discussion of which doctrinal and structural features play 
the greatest role in problematic criminal justice outcomes, and which reform 
proposals would be likely to have the greatest impact. 
III.  WHAT WORKED AND WHAT DIDN’T 
I (Adriaan Lanni) have taught the redesigned Criminal Adjudication class 
twice. Although a thematic approach inevitably necessitates some trade-offs, 
my impression is that the new course is more cohesive and gives our students a 
better understanding of criminal adjudication than the more traditional “bail to 
jail” approach. However, the course is still very much a work in progress. Here 
are some thoughts on what worked, what could be improved, and some things 
to keep in mind for those who are considering adopting this approach. 
Most obviously, the thematic approach comes at the cost of eliminating a 
fair amount of doctrine. I did not cover double jeopardy or the right to a speedy 
trial at all. Although we read Blakely v. Washington,16 we did not study the 
various twists and turns of the Apprendi17 doctrine in detail. Some students 
accustomed to courses that focus on doctrine and assignments exclusively from 
a casebook were surprised to see the amount of supplemental reading in the 
syllabus. I found that it was helpful to explain the rationale behind the course 
in the first class so that students understood why the syllabus was 
unconventional. This introduction also gave them fair warning that the non-
doctrinal materials were important and would be discussed in class and tested 
on the exam. One drawback is that editing down the secondary sources to 
capture only the important ideas and evidence takes a significant amount of 
time; we definitely assigned too much reading and plan to do more editing, 
particularly of the law review articles, in the future. 
The Swartz case study was a highlight of the course. Initially, I was a bit 
skeptical about the value of the case study method, but this approach is very 
well suited to analyzing prosecution and defense perspectives during the 
charging and bargaining process. The entire class was engaged throughout, and 
the discussion was much more nuanced and specific than the general 
discussions about prosecutorial discretion I tend to see in my substantive 
criminal law class. One challenge with this case study was ensuring a balanced 
discussion. Some students felt very strongly that the prosecution was improper. 
Although a defense of the prosecution’s point of view came through during the 
role-play, only a few students were willing to express their agreement with any 
of the prosecution’s bargaining positions. I suspect that there was more 
 
 16. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 17. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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sympathy for the prosecution’s tactics among the students than was voiced. I 
am considering using clickers to anonymously poll students both at the 
beginning and end of discussion of each decision point. If I am right that the 
students’ views of the case were more divided than it appeared, the anonymous 
polls might encourage students holding minority views to speak up. 
The students reacted most positively to the inclusion of emerging issues, 
such as “debtors’ prisons” and systemic litigation related to indigent defense 
funding. They commented that these topics made the class seem more relevant 
and connected to current developments on the ground. Several students 
expressed gratitude that the class included discussion of the prosecutor’s 
handling of the grand jury investigation of the shooting of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson and the Department of Justice’s Ferguson Report,18 which was 
published while the course was being taught. The course’s thematic approach 
made it possible to integrate discussion of such important current issues 
without having it seem like a digression from the normal business of the class. 
The visiting speakers, some of whom attended in person, while others 
spoke via videoconference, also helped bridge the gap between Supreme Court 
doctrine and recent developments. Since a significant amount of class time is 
handed over to visiting speakers, it is vital to choose speakers who are 
thoughtful about their work and are open to discussing criticisms of their 
points of view. One of our best sessions was on restorative justice, in large part 
because the speaker (clearly an excellent facilitator!) openly encouraged the 
students to critique the specifics of her program as well as the restorative 
justice approach more generally. Another potential drawback of visitors is that 
their schedules do not always allow them to visit the class on a particular day, 
which may make it necessary to rearrange the syllabus and split up themes. 
The racial impacts topic was set for the end of the course. It was 
successful, though it did involve some compromises elsewhere in the syllabus. 
Including Armstrong19 under this theme meant that we did not read this 
important case during our earlier discussion of prosecutorial discretion. And it 
might have been helpful for the students to have read about implicit bias 
research earlier on in the term. Although we discussed race in conjunction with 
doctrine many times over the course of the class, I sometimes felt as though I 
was holding back a broader discussion on this topic until we reached the racial 
impacts section of the syllabus. Nevertheless, as we discussed earlier, this 
approach did foster a more comprehensive discussion of the problem and 
potential reforms. This topic also helped tie the topics of the course together by 
inviting students to reconsider the various stages of the criminal process. 
The thematic, problem-oriented approach to teaching the course affected 
the way that students demonstrated their mastery of the material on the final 
 
 18. DOJ INVESTIGATION, supra note 9. 
 19. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996). 
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exam. The exam included a doctrinal fact pattern, an essay, and a set of 
“identifications” that required students to identify and discuss the significance 
of short quotations from cases and other course readings. Some of the 
identifications explicitly tested non-doctrinal material, but the exam did not 
look all that different from a conventional criminal adjudication exam. 
However, I did find that the students’ answers to the identification and essay 
questions were different from what I would expect in a conventional course. 
Students’ discussions of the significance of a doctrinal test, for example, 
tended to be broader and include the holding’s implications for the system as a 
whole as well as for the specific area of legal doctrine. And the answers to the 
essay questions were significantly more sophisticated and thoughtful than what 
I normally see in other courses. Both the experience of teaching the course and 
the student mastery demonstrated on the final exam have encouraged me to 
continue to use a thematic, problem-oriented approach to criminal 
adjudication. 
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APPENDIX 
CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION SAMPLE SYLLABUS20 
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Excerpt from Stephen Bright & Sia Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and 
Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013) 
Excerpt from Heather P. Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 341 
Excerpt from Carol Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political 
Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694 (2013) 
Excerpt from Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: The Next 
Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1309 (2013) 
Excerpt from Adam Liptak, Need-Blind Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 
2014 
Powell v. Alabama 
Gideon v. Wainwright 
2. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL 
Argersinger v. Hamlin; Scott v. Illinois 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; In re Gault 
Ross v. Moffit 
Excerpt from John P. Gross, What Matters More? A Day in Jail or a 
Criminal Conviction?, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 55 (2013) 
Excerpt from Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding 
Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (2013) 
 
 20. Each numbered topic is meant to take roughly one 1.5-hour class period. Most criminal 
procedure textbooks include edited versions of the majority of the cases in this syllabus and 
would work for this class. 
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3. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PART 1 
 A. Assessing Counsel’s Effectiveness 
Strickland v. Washington 
Rompilla v. Beard 
Bobby v. Van Hook 
Excerpts from Carol Steiker, Gideon’s Problematic Promises, 143 
DAEDALUS 51 (2014) 
4. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PART 2 
 B. Assessing Prejudice 
Lockhart v. Fretwell; Glover v. United States 
 C. Strickland and Guilty Pleas 
Padilla v. Kentucky 
Missouri v. Frye 
Lafler v. Cooper 
  D. Per Se Ineffectiveness 
Cronic; Bell v. Cone 
5. SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES/REFORMS TO INDIGENT DEFENSE COUNSEL 
SYSTEMS 
(Guest speaker involved in current systemic reform litigation) 
Excerpt from Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense 
Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427 (2009)  
Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York 
Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court 
State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Waters 
Excerpt from ABA, “The Missouri Project: A Study of the Missouri 
Public Defender System and Attorney Workload Standards” (2014) 
6. THE RIGHT TO CONFLICT-FREE REPRESENTATION; THE RIGHT TO SELF-
REPRESENTATION 
 A. The Right to Conflict-Free Representation 
Holloway v. Arkansas 
Cuyler v. Sullivan; Burger v. Kemp; Mickens v. Taylor  
Wheat v. United States  
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  B. Right to Self-Representation 
Faretta v. California 
United States v. Kaczynski 
II. BAIL AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
7. BAIL AND PREVENTATIVE DETENTION 
Listen to/read NPR report: “Behind the Bail Bond System” 
Excerpts from Vera Institute of Justice, “Fair Treatment of the Indigent: 
The Manhattan Bail Project” 
Summary of Bail Reform Act of 1984 
United States v. Dreier 
United States v. Salerno 
III. CHARGING, PLEA BARGAINING, AND THE GRAND JURY 
8. THE COMPARISON TO CIVIL SYSTEMS; THE PROSECUTORIAL DECISION 
WHETHER TO CHARGE 
Watch: 30-minute reality TV show depicting a homicide prosecution in 
France (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9ttrUx-5tE) 
Attica v. Rockefeller 
Ari Phillips, “How Two Guys, a Lobster Boat, and a District Attorney 
Made Climate History” (2014) 
(http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/ 09/10/3565445/lobster-boat-
district-attorney-climate-history/) 
Excerpts from William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s 
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004) 
Excerpts from Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing 
of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
869 (2009) 
9. THE GRAND JURY AND SCREENING 
Costello v. United States 
United States v. Williams 
Excerpts from Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the 
Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1265 (2006) 
Excerpts from Adriaan Lanni, Implementing the Neighborhood Grand 
Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND 
JURY (Roger Fairfax ed., 2010) 
Excerpts from media accounts and transcripts from State of Missouri v. 
Darren Wilson grand jury proceedings 
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10. THE GRAND JURY AND INVESTIGATIONS 
(Assistant U.S. Attorney guest speaker) 
United States v. Dionisio 
United States v. R. Enterprises 
ABA proposed grand jury reforms 
11. PLEA BARGAINING 
Excerpts from Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004) 
Excerpts from Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as 
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) 
Excerpts from Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984) 
Brady v. United States 
United States v. Kupa 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes 
United States v. Pollard 
United States v. Ruiz 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 
12. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CHARGING AND PLEA BARGAINING: 
THE AARON SWARTZ CASE 
Harvard Law School Case Studies Program, The Aaron Swartz Case 
Study 
IV. DISCOVERY 
13. DISCOVERY PART 1 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Jencks Act 
Arizona v. Youngblood 
Williams v. Florida 
Taylor v. Illinois 
14. DISCOVERY PART 2 
The Brady Rule (Brady; Agurs; Bagley; Kyles v. Whitley) 
Excerpts from Ellen Yaroshefsky, Why Do Brady Violations Happen?: 
Cognitive Bias and Beyond, CHAMPION, May 2013 
Excerpts from Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against 
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 
693 (1987) 
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Excerpts from Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 
IND. L.J. 481 (2009) 
Proposed Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act 
Excerpts from Brian P. Fox, An Argument Against Open-File Discovery 
in Criminal Cases, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425 (2013) 
V. JURY 
15. THE JURY RIGHT 
Duncan v. Louisiana  
Jury size (Williams; Ballew) 
Unanimity (Apodaca) 
Excerpts from Michael Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About 
How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 
(1997) 
16. JURY SELECTION AND COMPOSITION 
Duren v. Missouri 
Batson v. Kentucky 
Powers v. Ohio; Georgia v. McCollum; J.E.B. v. Alabama 
Purkett v. Elem; Hernandez v. New York 
Excerpt from Jeffrey B. Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125 
Excerpts from Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s 
Net to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or 
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (2011) 
Excerpts from Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations: The 
Contributions of Social Science, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 
(2005)  
17. JURY DELIBERATIONS AND VERDICT; PRETRIAL PUBLICITY 
  A. Jury Deliberations and Verdict 
Tanner v. United States 
United States v. Thomas 
Excerpts from Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black 
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) 
  B. Pretrial Publicity 
Skilling v. United States 
In re Tsarnaev 
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VI. SENTENCING 
18. COURTS VS. LEGISLATURES VS. JURIES; DISCRETIONARY VS. 
GUIDELINES APPROACHES 
Williams v. New York 
Brief description of Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Excerpts from Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1315 (2005) 
Excerpts from Judge James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just 
Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect 
Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2010) 
Excerpts from Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 
DUKE L.J. 951 (2003) 
Excerpts from Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359 (2005) 
19. LIMITS ON JUDICIAL SENTENCING 
  A. Apprendi and Its Progeny 
Apprendi v. New Jersey 
Blakely v. Washington 
Kimbrough; Gall 
  B. Fines and Probation 
Bearden v. Georgia 
Excerpts from DOJ Ferguson Report 
Excerpt from Note, Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (2015) 
20. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
(Guest speaker from restorative justice community-police partnership) 
Excerpts from HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE (2002) 
Proposed MA Senate Act 1001 “An Act Promoting Restorative Justice 
Practices” 
VIII. OUTCOMES: RACIAL EFFECTS AND THE PROBLEM OF 
INNOCENCE 
21. RACIAL EFFECTS 
Excerpts from Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 
UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012) 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] A THEMATIC APPROACH TO TEACHING CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION 479 
Excerpts from Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of 
Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012) 
Excerpt from MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) 
McCleskey v. Kemp 
Excerpts from Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital 
Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 
(1988) 
United States v. Armstrong 
22. SENTENCING AND RACIAL DISPARITY 
(Guest speaker from The Sentencing Project) 
Excerpts from Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in 
Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 87S (2011) 
Excerpts from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice 
System (2011) 
Excerpts from Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements: Changing 
Policies to Address Disparities, 23 CRIM. JUST. 16 (2008) 
23. INNOCENCE 
(Guest speaker from an innocence project) 
Excerpts from National Registry of Exonerations Report (2014) 
Excerpts from Steven Krieger, Why Our Justice System Convicts 
Innocent People and the Challenges Faced by Innocence Projects 
Trying to Exonerate Them, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 333 (2011) 
Excerpts from Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 55 (2008) 
Excerpts from BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: 
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) 
24. EVALUATIONS OF THE SYSTEM AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
Excerpts from Judge Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American 
Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099 (2014) 
Excerpts from WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) 
Excerpts from the Honorable Patti B. Saris, A Generational Shift for 
Federal Drug Sentences, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2015) 
Excerpts from Sentencing Project, “The State of Sentencing 2014” 
(2014) 
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